The truce between Israel and Hamas, brokered under U.S. mediation, marks not merely a cessation of hostilities after more than two years, but a potential turning point in the reconfiguration of regional power structures.

Yet the Gaza ceasefire, while temporarily halting active fighting, does not constitute peace and should not be so quickly interpreted as the definitive end of the broader conflict. Instead, it represents a fragile pause shaped by U.S. mediation, regional recalibrations, and the competing strategic interests of Israel, Hamas, and other state and non-state actors (NSAs). The underlying tensions, power vacuums, and humanitarian crises remain unresolved, making it premature to declare the Gaza war over. The significance of the truce lies less in the immediate calm it provides than in how it reshapes regional alignments, tests the limits of U.S. influence, and sets the stage for future contests over security, governance, and reconstruction in the Middle East.

The truce, established recently, is portrayed differently across the narratives of regional state and NSAs. The conclusion of the Gaza conflict concerns not the fate of the Gazan populace alone, but the strategic realignments of the principal stakeholders in response to rapidly evolving power dynamics across the Middle East. Telling the media that he has 'agreed to give peace a chance', Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has ostensibly accepted the 20-point framework underpinning the truce, which includes a ceasefire with Hamas, the release of hostages, and phased reconstruction in Gaza. At the same time, he has expressed reservations about certain parts of the proposal, notably the involvement of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the future governance of Gaza, and has firmly opposed both the creation of a Palestinian state and any PA role in overseeing reconstruction in the months and years to come. These concerns reflect how Netanyahu weighs U.S.-led proposals against his view of Israel's strategic interests.

Both Israel and Hamas present the ceasefire as a victory for themselves. From the perspective of the Jewish state, the transfer of surviving and deceased captives represents a major emotional milestone in the two-year history of the Gaza struggle. The accord established in Sharm al-Sheikh explicitly stipulates that Hamas, a designated terrorist organisation, must disarm -- a demand already unanimously made by the members of the Arab League in July. U.S. President Donald Trump later reinforced this position during a White House meeting with Argentine President Javier Milei, stating: 'If they don't disarm, we will disarm them'. An anonymous Hamas member has made it clear, however, that the group has no intention of laying down its arms.

Simultaneously, Hamas is presenting Israel's gradual withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as its own triumph. Over the weekend, 7,000 armed militants reasserted authority over the territories vacated by Israel. A critical issue in the Gaza Strip is the security dilemma faced by the hundreds of thousands relocating from the south to the north. Reports indicate that two Hamas members were found deceased, prompting immediate clashes with the opposing Dugmush clan. Israel is attempting to prevent Hamas from exploiting the power vacuum and re-establishing control over more than 50% of the territory from which the Jewish state has withdrawn, pending the arrival of the purported international stabilisation forces.

Sources indicate that the opposite scenario is equally perilous. A significant quantity of small arms has been acquired by various factions due to a weakened Hamas, and the power vacuum in the Gaza Strip could trigger civil conflict. Officials have yet to determine how long it will take to select and deploy stabilisation forces in Gaza under the 20-point ceasefire agreement. The experiences of the past two ceasefires suggest that both Israel and Hamas regarded them as temporary, using them to advance their respective positions. This time, however, there appears to be considerable pressure from the U.S. on both parties, underscoring that the current truce is less a resolution than a pause in an ongoing and complex conflict.

On Monday, 13 October, Trump travelled to Israel to address the Knesset before proceeding to Sharm el-Sheikh to participate in a high-level session on the Gaza ceasefire, co-chaired by Egypt. The summit brought together Arab and Muslim leaders at a moment of heightened regional tension, with deliberations shaped by two principal objectives:

Two significant regional actors were absent from the summit, despite their crucial role in shaping the region's future. Iran, though invited and having expressed its commitment to a ceasefire, did not send diplomats. Speculation had circulated that Iran might attend, but hardliners ultimately blocked its participation. Since the 12-day conflict in June, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has anticipated another Israeli assault. The Iranian leadership regards the purported end of the Gaza conflict as a victory for Hamas and warns that Israel's expansive military ambitions could ignite further regional tensions. In the wake of the Gaza truce, it is conceivable that Israel's leader might seek authorisation from Trump for action against Iran; however, no official request has been confirmed. Israel could also consider new operations in Gaza to reinforce Netanyahu's domestic standing, potentially with tacit approval from Trump, particularly given Iran's absence from the summit.

The reimposition of United Nations (UN) sanctions and the activation of the snapback mechanism by the European troika have heightened tensions in the region, prompting Tehran's leadership to signal a potential suspension of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to consider withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has enhanced its military capabilities through the acquisition of additional weaponry supplied by Russia, with all efforts concentrated on preparing for a potential Israeli strike. The Gaza conflict has delivered a stark lesson for Iran: its 'axis of resistance' has been severely weakened, with the Houthi movement in Yemen standing as the sole exception.

Tensions in the Red Sea are escalating dangerously. The Houthis recently seized a Dutch commercial vessel, killing one crew member, amid weeks of intense clashes between Israel and Ansar Allah. The conflict reached a new peak with the assassination of the Houthi government's prime minister by Israel, triggering sustained rocket attacks in retaliation. Abdel Malik al-Houthi, the movement's commander, has warned that any violation of the truce will prompt renewed strikes. The fallout for Red Sea shipping remains uncertain, with the Dutch vessel incident underscoring the growing risks to commercial navigation.

The Houthi actions highlight the fragility of maritime security in the Red Sea, a vital corridor for global trade and energy flows, bookended by the critical chokepoints of the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. With vessels from Europe, Asia, and the Middle East regularly transiting these waters, even minor incidents risk triggering broader disruptions or diplomatic disputes. Regional powers, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, face mounting pressure to safeguard these shipping lanes, which are crucial not only for commerce but also for energy exports. The incident shows how the Gaza conflict's repercussions extend beyond the immediate theatre, connecting the Israeli-Houthi confrontation to broader regional economic stability.

The escalation underscores the complexity of multi-front conflicts involving NSAs with transnational capabilities. While Israel's targeted operations against the Houthis signal a determination to deter attacks on its territory, the resulting cycle of retaliation risks drawing in other regional actors and international stakeholders. The potential for miscalculation is heightened by the intersecting interests of Iran, which supports the Houthis, and the U.S. and European states, which rely on uninterrupted maritime trade. As a result, the Red Sea has emerged as a secondary front in the broader strategic competition for influence in the Middle East, where both state and NSAs are testing the limits of power, deterrence, and international response.

At the same time, the U.S. and its regional military partners have struggled to contain the Houthi threat, with attempts to neutralise the group through targeted attacks and airstrikes inside Yemen often failing to achieve their objectives. These operations have not only fallen short of dismantling Houthi capabilities but have also risked further escalating regional tensions, drawing Tehran-backed forces deeper into the conflict and fuelling cycles of retaliation that complicate efforts to stabilise the Red Sea and surrounding area.

The director of the Turkish intelligence agency, who maintains strong personal connections with both the Hamas leadership and the U.S. delegation, was the initial participant in the indirect discussions during the recent summit regarding Trump's 20-point peace plan. Türkiye was one of eight Arab-Muslim nations to issue a joint statement endorsing the initiative and formally backed the truce. The 200-member U.S.-led task force overseeing it includes a Turkish representative, which poses a challenge for Israel. The Israeli Nagel Report, published by the Ministry of Defence in March 2025, had previously warned of potential escalation with Türkiye and suggested the possibility of overt armed confrontation.

Geopolitical competition has intensified across Syria, the Gaza Strip, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and the wider Eastern Mediterranean, while strategic chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz underscore the stakes for global trade and energy flows. Heightened tensions between Israel and Türkiye centre on these theatres and broader regional power dynamics. The U.S. seeks to foster Israeli-Turkish engagement, initiated between 2021 and 2022 but disrupted by the Gaza conflict. Despite the cessation of hostilities in Gaza, multiple flashpoints -- particularly in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf -- remain unresolved. Türkiye is actively participating in the Egyptian Gaza summit, presided over by Trump and Sisi, aiming to advance Palestinian statehood and bolster its soft power within the Arab-Islamic world

While Türkiye moves assertively to shape regional outcomes at the Egyptian Gaza summit, Israel's response reflects a cautious calculus, balancing external pressures against domestic political imperatives. The divergence highlights how even amid shared regional crises, states pursue markedly different strategies shaped by internal dynamics and strategic priorities.

Israel abstained from the Egyptian Gaza meeting, a decision that highlighted a significant divergence with other regional actors. The Israeli government avoided participation to prevent legitimising a conference on the two-state solution, particularly as the summit included Arab and European participants advocating a revival of Palestinian statehood. For Prime Minister Netanyahu's government -- dominated by nationalist and religious-right factions -- attendance could be seen domestically as implicit recognition of Palestinian sovereignty or acceptance of external oversight in Gaza. In this context, participating would conflict with Israel's current strategic narrative, which frames the truce primarily as a security measure rather than a political concession.

Strategically, Israel seeks to maintain autonomy in shaping Gaza's security future, avoiding forums that could undermine its control or strengthen regional rivals such as Egypt or Türkiye. At the same time, Prime Minister Netanyahu faces public frustration and war fatigue after years of conflict and hostage crises. By boycotting the summit, he preserved domestic political cohesion, even if the decision deepens Israel's international isolation and limits its influence over emerging regional realignments.

Trump's visit to Israel was particularly significant, as he had previously met Prime Minister Netanyahu four times at the White House but had never visited Israel during his second presidency. Over the weekend, Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and Ivanka Trump convened in Hostage Square to promote the 20-point peace plan and rally support for Netanyahu. Yet when his name was mentioned, the audience responded with pronounced hostility, underscoring how the end of the conflict has left the trajectory of Israeli domestic politics uncertain.

Detailed discussions on the specifics of Trump's 20-point peace proposal were only the beginning. Israel's response to Hamas, which currently controls the vacated areas, remains uncertain, and international diplomatic efforts on Palestinian statehood continue to diverge from Israeli objectives. Defence Minister Israel Kaatz has stressed that in the coming weeks, international stabilisation forces will need to work to eliminate Gaza's tunnel networks, noting that the Israel Defense Forces's (IDF) operations in Gaza City remain incomplete. While the truce could offer a chance to rehabilitate Israel's international reputation, progress is likely to be slow, given the widespread reports and images depicting Gaza in the midst of a humanitarian catastrophe marked by mass casualties, displacement, infrastructure collapse, and severe shortages of food, water, medicine, and shelter.

Amid Israel's cautious posture and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, regional actors are moving to fill the diplomatic vacuum, with Egypt emerging as a central mediator capable of shaping the next phase of post-conflict stabilisation.

Following the conclusion of the Gaza conflict, Egypt is striving to reassert its regional influence, which has notably declined in recent years. After Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian border region, humanitarian assistance has begun flowing through the Rafah border crossing. The Israeli operation against Qatar has significantly strengthened Egypt's position as a mediator. If Cairo successfully prevents the expulsion of the Gazan population and leverages Trump's visit to chart a path towards Palestinian independence, it will play a prominent role for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Moreover, key European nations, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have also been persuaded of Egypt's central role. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has announced that an international conference will be convened in collaboration with Egypt to coordinate Gaza's rehabilitation.

Egypt's renewed diplomatic ambitions are closely tied to its broader strategic goals in the Middle East. By facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid through the Rafah crossing and engaging directly with both Palestinian authorities and international stakeholders, Cairo seeks to consolidate its influence across the Gaza Strip and the wider Levant. Success in this role would not only enhance Egypt's standing with GCC states but also position it as an indispensable interlocutor for European powers, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Beyond humanitarian coordination, Egypt is leveraging its mediation to assert authority in regional security discussions, aiming to prevent further escalation between Israel, Hamas, and other non-state actors while promoting a framework for Palestinian statehood that aligns with its geopolitical interests

The GCC states are still grappling with the fallout from Israel's actions in Doha in September 2025. Beyond ongoing concerns over Iran's nuclear program, they now face heightened security risks stemming from Israel's military operations, which have demonstrated both strategic reach and operational audacity. These developments have prompted a broad reassessment of regional defense postures, compelling GCC governments to explore new security architectures and deepen strategic partnerships. Qatar has secured a U.S. security guarantee comparable to NATO's Article 5, while Saudi Arabia has concluded a defense agreement with Pakistan, signaling a shift toward diversified security assurances beyond traditional alliances.

Beyond these bilateral arrangements, the GCC is actively exploring deeper intra-regional coordination to address emerging threats, including missile defense, intelligence sharing, and rapid-response capabilities. The events in Gaza and the broader Levant have exposed vulnerabilities in existing defense postures, prompting both public and private discussions on the need for a more robust, collective deterrence framework. These recalibrations are not merely reactive; they reflect a strategic effort to balance relations with external powers while preserving regional autonomy, sending a clear signal to Tehran and Jerusalem that any unilateral action affecting GCC states will be met with coordinated diplomatic -- and, if necessary, military -- responses.

GCC states and other regional actors have initiated discussions on the formation of a Middle East or 'Islamic' NATO -- a collective security framework intended to integrate defense capabilities, intelligence sharing, and crisis response across Muslim-majority states. While still in preliminary formulation, proponents argue that such a structure could serve as a regional deterrent, address strategic vulnerabilities exposed by recent conflicts, and assert a more unified Gulf and broader Islamic strategic posture, complementing existing bilateral agreements and signaling to external powers that the region is capable of coordinated defense

In parallel to these regional security initiatives, external powers are carefully observing how Middle Eastern states navigate the Gaza ceasefire and related diplomatic developments. Among them, China has emerged as a particularly attentive actor, assessing both the immediate humanitarian implications and the broader strategic opportunities for engagement.

Alongside U.S. mediation, GCC recalibrations, and Egypt's renewed diplomatic ambitions, China has closely monitored the Gaza ceasefire and the Egyptian summit, viewing the temporary truce both as a test of regional stability and international crisis management, and as a tentative glimmer of hope, while upholding the principle that 'Palestine should be governed by the Palestinians'. Beijing views the ceasefire both as a potential opportunity to expand its diplomatic footprint in the Middle East and as a measure of U.S. credibility. Chinese analysts have highlighted the importance of stabilising Gaza to prevent spillovers into neighbouring regions, including key Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) corridors, while also emphasising that reconstruction efforts must respect local agency and sovereignty -- a stance consistent with China's broader principle of non-interference.

Chinese commentary stresses caution and strategic balance. While recognising the U.S.-brokered 20-point peace plan, Chinese officials have refrained from endorsing it outright, instead emphasising the need for multilateral engagement to prevent unilateral actions by Israel or Iran from reigniting the conflict. Beijing frames humanitarian reconstruction as both a stabilising imperative and an opportunity for long-term developmental cooperation, highlighting that infrastructure, energy, and water projects could serve as platforms for constructive engagement without direct involvement in military or security disputes.

Beijing also sees the Gaza ceasefire as a chance to project its model of engagement, contrasting its approach with what it portrays as the transactional, security-driven focus of U.S. diplomacy. Analysts note that successful stabilisation and reconstruction in Gaza could enable China to gain influence over aid distribution, infrastructure development, and regional economic integration, positioning Beijing as a credible interlocutor for both regional actors and international donors. At the same time, by maintaining public neutrality, China preserves strategic flexibility, allowing engagement with Israel, Egypt, the GCC, and Palestinian authorities without alienating any party.

In essence, China's stance on the Gaza ceasefire reflects a dual-track strategy: promoting regional stability and humanitarian relief, while subtly advancing its strategic influence and demonstrating the utility of its development-oriented, non-interventionist approach. Beijing's potential role in reconstruction, coupled with its diplomatic posture, underscores how great powers beyond the U.S. are poised to shape post-conflict outcomes and regional alignments in the Middle East. China's cautious but strategic engagement in Gaza illustrates the growing influence of non-Western powers in shaping regional stability -- a dynamic that will also bear on the prospects for broader initiatives like the Abraham Accords and efforts toward economic and political integration.

The key question now is whether Trump's diplomatic efforts can successfully restore a regional order rooted in the Abraham Accords, contingent on both a resolution of the Gaza crisis and the containment of Iran's nuclear ambitions. At this stage, it is premature to draw definitive conclusions. While economic incentives may favour greater regional integration, recent developments have largely deepened existing political and strategic divergences.

The Gaza conflict has disrupted the cautious process of normalisation between Israel and some Arab states. While the Abraham Accords framework remains formally intact, the images of destruction in Gaza have compelled Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to recalibrate their public positions, emphasising Palestinian statehood to maintain domestic and regional legitimacy. This dynamic underscores that the Palestinian issue, once sidelined, continues to occupy a central place in Arab political narratives.

Beyond the immediate military and diplomatic calculations, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza poses a critical test for all actors involved. Reconstruction, expected to cost tens of billions of dollars, risks becoming a new arena of competition among Gulf donors, Western agencies, and regional powers such as Egypt and Türkiye. How these resources are allocated will play a decisive role in shaping the emerging political order in Gaza.

The humanitarian crisis has reached an unprecedented scale. More than half of Gaza's infrastructure has been either destroyed or rendered inoperative, including hospitals, power plants, and water facilities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports that Gaza teeters on the edge of catastrophe: more than 80% of buildings lie in rubble, 89% of water and sanitation systems are destroyed, and over 96% of households face severe water insecurity. The civilian population remains trapped between political paralysis and structural devastation, with international organisations struggling to establish corridors for medical and food supplies. Even if the ceasefire holds, only a fraction of pledged aid may reach its intended recipients, as seen already, potentially hindered by disagreements among major donors over oversight, delivery mechanisms, and the political conditions attached to assistance.

The GCC states, particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, are positioning themselves as central actors in the reconstruction process. For Doha, financial aid to Gaza has long served as an instrument of influence, allowing it to maintain channels of communication with both Hamas and Western capitals. Riyadh, meanwhile, is motivated by a dual imperative: to demonstrate leadership within the Arab world and to reassert its moral legitimacy after years of cautious alignment with Israel. The UAE's approach is more pragmatic and image-driven, seeking to channel reconstruction funds through internationally recognised agencies in order to preserve its reputation as a reliable partner for Western governments.

Egypt and Türkiye, both with historical and strategic stakes in Gaza, could potentially serve as key logistical and political intermediaries. Cairo's control of the Rafah crossing provides it with considerable leverage over the flow of materials and humanitarian aid, positioning Egypt as a gatekeeper of reconstruction. Ankara, by contrast, emphasises its role as a defender of the Palestinian cause, pairing humanitarian relief with political advocacy for statehood. This competition between Egypt and Türkiye is not merely about aid delivery but about the symbolic leadership of the Sunni Muslim world -- a contest that has intensified since the Arab uprisings.

Western actors, particularly the European Union and the U.S., view reconstruction as a vehicle to promote governance reforms and limit the re-emergence of Hamas as a political or military power. However, the insistence on strict conditionality -- including demilitarisation and external monitoring of funds -- risks alienating local actors and delaying urgent humanitarian relief. The tension between immediate reconstruction needs and long-term governance objectives reflects a broader dilemma: whether Gaza's recovery should be treated as a technocratic development project or as part of a political transition towards sustainable peace.

At the institutional level, coordination of reconstruction remains highly fragmented. Competing initiatives -- from the UN's proposed Gaza Recovery Mechanism to ad hoc coalitions led by regional powers -- have created a patchwork of overlapping authorities. Without a coherent framework or an accepted local governance structure, aid distribution risks reinforcing existing patronage networks or fuelling new rivalries among Palestinian factions. In this context, the legitimacy of any post-war administration in Gaza will depend not only on its capacity to provide security but also on its ability to manage reconstruction resources equitably.

Ultimately, the struggle over Gaza's reconstruction transcends humanitarianism. It represents a contest over narratives, influence, and the future balance of power in the Middle East. The actor that successfully integrates humanitarian assistance with credible political vision -- one that addresses both immediate needs and the long-term demand for sovereignty -- will shape Gaza's trajectory for years to come. Whether reconstruction becomes a platform for renewed regional cooperation or another instrument of geopolitical competition will determine if the current ceasefire marks the beginning of stabilisation or merely a pause before renewed conflict.

For Washington, the ceasefire advances broader strategic objectives. Trump's mediation seeks to assert U.S. leadership amid shifting global alliances, curb Iranian influence, and reinvigorate a modified version of the Abraham Accords. Yet the credibility of U.S. diplomacy will hinge on whether the truce produces tangible political progress, rather than merely ushering in another cycle of temporary calm and strategic stagnation.

The Biden administration's cautious disengagement from Middle Eastern affairs in the early 2020s created a perception of a strategic vacuum, which China, Russia, and regional middle powers such as Türkiye and Iran sought to exploit. Trump's return to the presidency and his renewed intervention in the Gaza crisis thus represent an attempt to reclaim American primacy in regional diplomacy and demonstrate that Washington remains the indispensable arbiter of Middle Eastern order. In this context, the ceasefire is not only a humanitarian necessity but also a geopolitical instrument aimed at re-establishing U.S. credibility among both allies and adversaries.

The administration's approach reflects a dual-track strategy: on the one hand, reinforcing deterrence against Iran and its regional proxies; on the other, reviving the economic and diplomatic networks underpinning the Abraham Accords. The current iteration of the Accords envisioned by the White House includes a stronger security component -- with implicit guarantees to Gulf states against Iranian aggression -- and a conditional path towards Palestinian political normalisation. By presenting the truce as the first step in a broader regional stabilisation plan, Washington hopes to integrate Israel back into cooperative frameworks with Arab partners while constraining Tehran's capacity to capitalise on post-war disarray.

Domestically, the ceasefire diplomacy also serves political functions. After years of partisan polarisation and declining confidence in U.S. foreign policy institutions, the Trump administration seeks to demonstrate decisiveness and statesmanship on the international stage. The Gaza mediation provides an opportunity to reassert the U.S. as both a peacemaker and an enforcer of order. However, critics within Congress and the foreign policy establishment caution that this strategy risks conflating symbolic leadership with sustainable policy outcomes. Without meaningful progress towards Palestinian governance reform and regional integration, Washington's role may appear performative rather than transformative.

Moreover, Washington's balancing act is complicated by diverging expectations among its allies. European governments such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, while supportive of U.S. engagement, place particular emphasis on humanitarian reconstruction and human rights accountability. In contrast, Gulf states seek guarantees of security and autonomy in managing the post-conflict environment. Israel, for its part, remains wary of any initiative that could dilute its operational freedom in Gaza or open the door to renewed external oversight. The U.S. administration must therefore navigate a delicate equilibrium -- between asserting leadership and avoiding overcommitment, between projecting strength and exercising restraint.

A successful outcome would cement Trump's mediation as a defining triumph of his diplomacy, reinforcing his personal legacy while reasserting U.S. leverage in a region governed ever more by pragmatic, transactional dynamics. If it falters, however, it may reinforce the narrative of American decline and embolden rival powers to expand their footprint in the Middle East. The coming months will thus determine whether the Gaza ceasefire becomes a cornerstone of renewed U.S. regional engagement or another episode in the long cycle of crisis management without resolution.

The Gaza ceasefire represents a precarious pause, not a resolution. How Israel, Hamas, and regional powers navigate security, reconstruction, and political legitimacy will define the future of the enclave -- and signal who truly wields influence in the Middle East. U.S. mediation, GCC recalibrations, and the manoeuvres of Egypt, Türkiye, and Iran are testing the limits of power and diplomacy in real time. The ultimate question remains whether this truce can translate into lasting stability or if it will dissolve into yet another cycle of violence and strategic brinkmanship.

Yet deeper questions loom: Can the U.S. genuinely enforce a durable peace, or is its role primarily performative, serving domestic political narratives more than regional security? Will Israel leverage the ceasefire to consolidate unilateral control while sidelining Palestinian governance, thereby undermining prospects for a meaningful two-state solution? Are regional actors such as Egypt, Türkiye, and the Gulf states stepping into a vacuum responsibly -- or exploiting humanitarian reconstruction to expand their influence? And as China and other non-Western powers assert growing leverage, is the traditional U.S.-led order in the Middle East facing a permanent structural shift that Washington may no longer fully control?