China's efforts to bypass the Strait of Malacca have faltered, leaving it more reliant on vulnerable Indian Ocean chokepoints
Indian Ocean chokepoints, especially the Strait of Malacca, have long served as arteries of China's commerce while simultaneously being the sources of strategic vulnerability. Any disruption, whether through conflict, piracy, or geopolitical manoeuvre, could deliver a severe shock to the Chinese economy. Beijing itself acknowledged this exposure in 2003 and labelled it the 'Malacca Dilemma.' Since then, this dilemma has shaped China's expansive posture in the Indian Ocean. To mitigate the risk, China has pursued a host of alternatives, yet the core questions remain unresolved. Has Beijing's dependence on these chokepoints diminished or deepened over the past two decades? Does this vulnerability explain China's growing naval presence and its drive for military footholds across the region? And to what extent do Beijing's civilian and military initiatives spring from this underlying strategic anxiety?
In the early 2000s, Beijing's dependence on the Strait was overwhelming as China had become a net energy importer in 1993. By 2010, as picture 1 shows, nearly 77 percent of its energy imports transited Malacca. The same narrow channel also carried most of China's trade with Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, making it the jugular vein under US naval dominance. Beijing's unease deepened as the US, India, and Australia expanded their naval cooperation through Malabar exercises. Even after Australia and later India pulled back from the first QUAD, the prospect of a revived alignment among these powers ensured that Chinese sensitivities around chokepoint vulnerabilities remained acute.
Therefore, China consistently sought strategies to counter this vulnerability, leading to potential diversion of the majority of maritime traffic through Sunda, Lombok and Ombai-Wetar Straits in the Southeast Asia, exploration of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the Arctic, overland oil and gas pipelines from Russia and Central Asia and overland trade routes and railway tracks to destinations in Europe and Asia.
In 2024, China's energy import climbed to US$390 billion, and nearly 80 percent of it, worth US$312 billion, came through the Malacca Strait.
Additionally, China has poured billions into hydropower, nuclear, solar, batteries and other clean energy to cut its reliance on foreign oil and gas. Yet after two decades of effort, the dependence remains, and its appetite for energy keeps growing. In 2024, China's energy import climbed to US$390 billion, and nearly 80 percent of it, worth US$312 billion, came through the Malacca Strait.
As Beijing builds massive data centres to power its Artificial Intelligence (AI) engines and doubles down on robotics, fabrication facilities, precision manufacturing, processing and producing critical minerals, chemicals, plastics, fertilisers, among other energy-intensive industries, demand for reliable power will only grow, and with itenergy imports. Domestic alternatives offer little relief: oil extraction in the Tarim Basin remains expensive, while Russian pipeline supplies cover only a fraction of national consumption. Middle Eastern crude, by contrast, remains far cheaper and indispensable. Even China's strategic petroleum reserve, sufficient for roughly 90 plus days, does not fundamentally alter the equation. Instead, it underscores the reality that Beijing's peak energy demand lies ahead, not behind.
The goods trade through these chokepoints, similarly, has grown exponentially in the last two decades. Beijing's merchandise trade with Africa, the Middle East and the European Union, set out in Table 1, is vast in scale. Taken together, this concentration of energy and goods flows underscores Beijing's acute exposure at the Indian Ocean chokepoints on which such dependence rests.
Table 1: China's Goods Trade with Africa, the Middle East, and the EU-27 (2010-2024) (Merchandise trade; exports + imports; US$ billions)
Source: Authors
Other nearby straits, particularly the Sunda, Lombok, and the Ombai-Wetar Straits, offer alternative routes to Malacca. The Sunda Strait, however, is generally avoided by large ships, weighing over 100,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT), due to its narrow and shallow waters, especially in the middle and the presence of numerous navigational hazards, namely, sandbars, strong currents and man-made obstacles such as offshore oil wells on Java Island. The second option, the Lombok Strait, being deeper, wider and less congested, has remained a preferred route for super tankers and ultra-large bulk carriers. Ships opting for Lombok then pass through the Makassar Strait for their onward journey. However, both Sunda and Lombok add 1,787 km and 2,963 km, respectively, to a ship's transit route, adding 2.5 to 4.8 days extra to arrive at the Chinese ports.
Table 2: Navigation Situation in Straits near Indonesia
Source: Compiled by Authors
Ombai-Wetar Straits, the third option, is even further to the east, has adequate depth and navigability for ultra-large ships and tankers. It doubles as a covert highway for US nuclear submarines, making it strategically important after Malacca for Washington. In sum, none of these straits offer strategic assurance to China; all remain exposed to US and allied naval dominance.
China has also sought land-based workarounds. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, it has pushed trade corridors via Pakistan and Myanmar, anchored at Gwadar and Kyaukphyu, to bypass these maritime chokepoints. On paper, these corridors promise access to the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal; in practice, they remain costly, insecure, and strategically fragile.
Beijing sold the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gwadar, envisioned as the gateway linking Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea and beyond to the Middle East. In practice, it has collapsed under the weight of geography, politics, and insurgency. Gwadar lies in Balochistan, a province riven by separatist violence and deep local hostility to Chinese projects. The overland route from Xinjiang runs through harsh terrain and conflict-prone regions, making it a logistical nightmare. Even the port remains underused, with its 2020 handling of mere 22 ships, its busiest year on record.
Myanmar's Kyaukphyu port is often cast as Beijing's Bay of Bengal gateway, yet it offers no solution to the Malacca dilemma. The US$15 billion China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, designed to funnel oil and gas into Yunnan, is undermined by civil war, insurgencies and Beijing's interfering approach. Operation 1027 highlighted the fragility of pipelines and roads that run through conflict zones, despite Chinese efforts at security patrols and drone surveillance. Even at full capacity, the pipelines would cover barely 5-8 percent of China's demand, a marginal offset. And any vessel docking at Kyaukphyu would remain under the gaze of the Indian Navy. Geography, instability, and geopolitics have, therefore, reduced China's supposed 'Malacca escape' to an expensive illusion.
Other options, from new Arctic shipping lanes to Beijing's rail links with Europe, remain too limited and underdeveloped to make a real difference. As mentioned above, about 80 per cent of China's oil and gas imports in 2023 still squeezed through the Strait of Malacca, a reminder of how little its strategic bind has changed.
As the world shifts toward multipolarity and Washington pulls back, the Malacca Strait and its neighbouring passages are no longer just regional chokepoints. They are flashpoints of great-power rivalry.
As the world shifts toward multipolarity and Washington pulls back, the Malacca Strait and its neighbouring passages are no longer just regional chokepoints. They are flashpoints of great-power rivalry. China's dependence on these lanes has not eased, and its answer is further augmentation of hard power in the Indian Ocean region. Beijing is pushing its navy far beyond the Western Pacific, from a permanent base in Djibouti to footholds in Gwadar, Sri Lanka, Chittagong and perhaps even Cambodia to fortified islands in the South China Sea. The strategy is clear: build a maritime shield in the Western Pacific and project power into the Indian Ocean, where US and Indian navies still hold sway. The lesson is stark: in a multipolar world, sea lanes decide power.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
Ananya Vellore is a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
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